Chaucer's Provisions for Future Contingencies by Ronquist, Eyvind
Chaucer's Provisions for Future Contingencies 
Eyvind  Ronquist 
I 
In Chaucer's narratives, people think about the future,  and typically they find  it 
uncertain.1 Quelle  surprise! you exclaim ironically, since narrative requires suspense 
in the steps between beginning and ending, or otherwise it would become the expo-
sition of  a static, allegorical, universal grid. The uncertain steps of  narrative might 
only be those of  characters within a story, whereas the omniscient narrator would 
know the plot and is beguiling the reader. For Chaucer, however, uncertainty ex-
tends to the narrator, and what is reached by the ending is only a hypothesis.2 There 
is also a choice of  narrators. The beguilement of  the reader in the suspense of  a story 
becomes confrontation  with something like a real problem of  choosing from  past to 
future.  Where there is a real problem, there may be various trials of  possible solu-
tions. Each plan has steps taken in a distinctive pattern, and we learn distinct and 
ingenious ways of  conceiving of  what we may do in the course of  time. Thus, among 
Chaucer's other works, the loose gathering of  Canterbury  Tales  rehearses tales of 
divergent strategy and scope for  which contentious individual narrators were further 
invented. I will particularly consider "The Nun's Priest's Tale," but add some obser-
vations about Troilus  and  Criseyde? 
My investigation here concerns Chaucer's work with the problem of  future 
contingents, the problem raised first  in Aristotle's De interpretatione  9 about the 
truth value of  statements about the future.4  It is simplest to hold that statements 
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about the past and present are either true or false,  so that affirmation  of  proposition 
ρ implies denial of  not-p C the Law of  Contradiction. Singular matters of  the past 
were or still are strictly speaking contingent, in that they might not have happened — 
"Caesar might not have crossed the Rubicon" — but we work with the assumed 
fact,  "Caesar did cross the Rubicon."5 However, matters of  the future  cannot be 
treated as already "fact,"  and so their contingency has a different  status.6 The sun 
will rise in all likelihood, but human causation, due to "deliberation and action" as 
Aristotle said, particularly has less predictability and probability. 
The usual opinion is that of  the future  the only thing logically true is a double 
Vel statement of  two possible cases. For example, on the morning of  30 May 2003 I 
did read an earlier and shorter form  of  this paper in Halifax,  Nova Scotia. What was 
true on the 30th was that on the 31st I would either still be in Halifax  or (v for  Vel) that 
I would not be, each half  of  which remained contingent (perhaps I would forget  a 
crucial engagement and must fly  home the evening of  the 30th). Put formally,  I would 
then have said, "On 31 May 2003,1 will be in Halifax  and it is possible I will not be 
ν I will not be in Halifax  and it is possible I will be." A future  contingent in the 
definition  of  Pierre d'Ailly is "something that will be and has the possibility of  not 
being or that will not be and has the possibility of  being."7 
I have loosely been calling this problem "logical," and certainly it was taken up 
by medieval logicians, but I find  it is frequently  not discussed by modern textbooks. 
This seems to occur when logic is considered to be the art of  relating propositions, 
while disregarding their content.8 Truth is compatibility in this regard, rather than 
verifiability.  Contingency, in contrast, has to do with matters that may or may not be 
known and verified,  so they cannot universally be asserted; it is empirical.9 Past, 
present, and future  are human matters, and the question is what we can assert. Thus 
Chaucer directly has his characters worry about this lack of  certainty. 
In dealing with time, logic is supplemented by narrative, rhetoric, and theol-
ogy. Narrative may be eased by probability, custom, law, and pious practices, so that 
the future  may seem more certain. Fiction can claim certainty about all the phases of 
an assumed event and so become, as Aristotle might say, "more philosophical" than 
history (cf.  Poetics 9). The narration may even be what we call omniscient. But this 
is a term borrowed from  theology. A rhetorical form  of  theology is prophecy, and so 
medieval logicians worried whether "There will come an antichrist" had special 
status (Normone 89). And especially God may be given the best right to omnis-
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cience, not knowing things temporally. In the problem of  the uncertainty of  the fu-
ture, Christians, at least from  Pelagius and Augustine on, worried about God's more-
than-scrutiny, His guidance and even knowledge of  our choices, and consequently 
they advanced theories of  Predestination particularly in the provision of  salvation. If 
to God's scrutiny omniscience is attributed, and His eternity does not exactly have 
past and future,  He does not require contingency. Then He also knows—from  our 
point of  view, already—human choices, and the freedom  of  the will seems thrown 
into question. Even salvation would be predestined. But still it may be that sin-
ridden human beings may do what they choose and are capable of,  as in the formula, 
"Faciens quod in se est, de congruo meretur gratiam" (a technical phrase meaning 
something like "Those who actively do what they can on their own are worthy of 
appropriate grace"). Such a person is said to be granted a "semi-merit" without the 
further  grace of  "condignity" (see further  Oberman, Harvest  129-45, 170-71). I 
should add that I will sometimes use predestination  in a looser sense, for  any appar-
ent divine or fated  forecertainty  and call fatalism  thinking that depreciates contin-
gency.10 
Theological responses have differed,  and we shall see Chaucer aware of  the 
lack of  consensus. As a teller of  stories and of  people telling stories on varying 
principles, he dealt with human temporality and might find  differing  confidence  in 
divine certainty. It would be for  the observation of  human beings that he would 
emphasize moments at which the future  is contingent. My argument is that he does 
so to free  future  acts from  the constraint of  repetition. This would also account for 
his considerable liberty of  enquiry, experiment, and narratorial invention. 
The lack of  consensus promotes a certain skepticism about theologians. This 
does not make Chaucer a disbeliever, as there can be a variety of  piety called skeptical 
fideism  (Delany). Skepticism about the ways of  predestination need not be opposed 
to religious practice. For reconciliation of  contingent action with a watchful  divin-
ity, consider confession  and repentence, which allow people to stop in their tracks 
and change their ways. Thus, the humility of  skepticism permits reflection  and revi-
sion. Chaucer's narratives do not roll in an exemplary way from  once-upon-a-time 
to happily-ever-after  but to disjuncture, uncertain hope, disillusionment, and only 
then to prospects that may rise from  humiliation. The characters pause pensively 
(though not always penitently) to consider what honourable record they may be 
making, and they also have near next things to worry about — what spouse to take, 
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how to deal with a tyrant, when it may be better not to do what they did in the past or 
follow  traditional advice. This permits the future  to be faced  as an experiment, prag-
matically, and not as the pageant of  tradition (see more fully  Ronquist, "Rhetoric"). 
Reading Chaucer is a therapy, watching characters detach themselves from  their 
fixed  ideas, watching Chaucer try their voices. I will discuss some instances. 
II 
Characters may drop their fictive  inventions, as Walter does the apparently 
savage tests of  the obedience of  Grisildis in "The Clerk's Tale." That the tale projects 
a new sort of  marriage arrangement in the future,  and indeed a different  conception 
of  political power, can be argued from  Walter's taking of  Grisildis's peasant father 
into the palace in the last phase of  the story, even before  the mocking second epi-
logue that manuscripts attribute to Chaucer's own voice. The alternative suggestion 
in Troilus  and  Criseyde  that love is a continuing negotiation rather than an inevita-
bility is carried further  in the Wife  of  Bath's changes and in the modifications  by the 
characters of  "The Franklin's Tale" of  their initial concepts of  love. Change of  habit 
can begin in the scrutiny of  self-description,  a less-than-formal  confession  (see Leices-
ter on the Wife  of  Bath, 82-158). There is guarded optimism of  improvement in the 
Canterbury  Tales,  so that after  "The Knight's Tale" has argued for  what it names a 
virtue of  necessity, a change of  attitude, and a second chance, the Knight can object 
to the Monk's tale of  repetitious and inevitable loss. 
Chaucer can use the language of  fatalism,  but I submit that he was interested in 
the active condition of  fatalists.  This appears even in the relatively conservative 
narrative handling of  passage into an uncertain future  in Troilus  and  Criseyde.11  The 
appearance in Troilus  and  Criseyde  of  reflections  taken quite directly fromBoethius's 
Consolation  of  Philosophy has long been recognized, since Chaucer also translated 
that text as a guide to thought. Critics of  Troilus  and  Criseyde  make reference  to the 
Consolation  to show the "errors" of  Chaucer's characters in that they rely on posi-
tions subsequently refuted  by Boethius's authoritative Philosophy (but see Eldredge, 
Pearsall 175 for  "a more than usually painful  honesty" of  their discussions, and 
Camargo for  Pandarus in the momentary role of  Philosophia). Notably, in Book 
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Four Troilus, in a lonely temple, is overheard by Pandarus casting possible argu-
ments and repeatedly concluding that it has already been divinely foreseen  and thus 
is ordained by predestination that he should forego  Criseyde (the Trojan parliament 
had decided she should be exchanged for  a Greek prisoner of  war): 
"For certeynly, this wot I wel," he seyde, 
"That forsight  of  divine purveyaunce 
Hath seyn alwey me to forgon  Criseyde." 
(Tr  4.960-62) 
The Boethian argument against this position (5, pr. 6), as I understand it, is that 
the Divine Purveyaunce Troilus invokes—we would revert to the same roots in Latin 
and say Providence—is a looking out for  (pro)  and not a looking forward  (prae). 
Providence permits choice, while watchfully  providing goals: we act in accordance 
with Providence when we choose what is best and act on it.12 The Divinity knows 
human acts and the plan of  salvation, but in a way that is not cast along the line of 
time. Troilus at the moment of  his apparent certainty saw no alternative contin-
gency. Moreover, he seemed to take love with Criseyde as the highest of  choices, 
conceived of  with the nobility of  the songs of  Philosophy in Boethius (e.g., Tr  3.1744-
72). It had been suggested by Pandarus that he find  a new love (Tr  4.400-27), but 
Troilus would not abandon the virtue of  his loyalty. He may see himself  without 
Criseyde in a "foregone"  conclusion, but he does not renounce her, and never will. 
What he once determined continues down the days. Troilus's argument in favour  of 
predestination is thus better taken as a sign of  his character. We read the argument 
not for  its persuasive conclusion but for  its procedures and assumptions, and we 
suppose he is one who steers every possibility to the same conclusion, and that he is 
a fatalist.  Moreover, we follow  the story to see what a fatalist  may do in various 
circumstances. We see in Troilus that he is liable to emotional certainty so absolute 
it reduces him to collapse and fainting,  and that he withholds spontaneous action. 
Troilus thus endures his commitment even when circumstances seem no longer to 
require it. In withholding himself  from  violent interruption of  the plan to arrange the 
return of  Antenor, he will also have contributed to the ultimate defeat  of  Troy, but 
that is a large story which by now we are pretty much unable to suppose could have 
gone any other way.13 
In contrast, Criseyde shares with Boethius a long diatribe on the vagaries of 
Fortune, but does not conclude that external goods, the goods of  Fortune, should be 
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eschewed. She would prefer  to do so—she seems content to lead the life  of  a widow 
reading the tragic history of  Thebes—but she engages in temporal negotiation in the 
precarious situations of  her survival in Troy after  the defection  of  her father  and in 
the Greek camp after  her arbitrary exchange (an exchange she might have prevented 
by ceding her autonomy to marriage with Troilus).14 She acts upon her thinking 
about Fortune in discourses that avoid a conclusion and a series of  choices that try to 
make the best of  an immediate situation. She treats as an object of  exchange a brooch 
which Troilus had given her as a memento. Criseyde is the more capable of  improvi-
sation of  the two, but the tale tries to favour  continuing and continuing. 
Both Troilus and Criseyde stay in the middle development of  the Boethian 
argument that trusts to a rising hierarchy as in Plato, while they attempt to maximize 
temporal happiness. Moreover, the theory of  each is both contradicted and con-
firmed  by the larger story. For Troilus the contradiction is that he seeks to turn into 
destiny the happiness of  a moment. If  Troilus is fated,  it is to discontinuity—breaks 
in love and the failure  to effect  the closure of  revenge on his rival. Criseyde imag-
ines too soon that her love with Troilus has ended, but also contradicts herself  by 
making an improvised declaration promising expedient subterfuge  to make perma-
nent the best of  things on a certain day in the future,  a strategem of  return to perma-
nent love that she does not enact, easing instead into a new liaison. Troilus, in con-
trast, fatalistically  expects day to day that she will be doing something, when he 
might instead be recognizing the risks of  contingency. Troilus seems to confirm  the 
philosophy of  Fortune in losing the pleasure of  Criseyde, Criseyde that of  Predesti-
nation by surviving with her father  on the winning side of  the war. 
Troilus treats as inevitable what has been and continues it as his own decision. 
The emotional response to a lovable appearance is beyond control (Chaucer 
objectified  it by saying that the manifestation  of  the person who invokes love is 
divine), but Troilus pledges fidelity  to the disturbance, while Criseyde is puzzled by 
it and suspects intoxication: epiphany is not inevitable.15 Criseyde particularly shows 
how contingent and undetermined the future  remains—love is not inevitable nor is 
her enslavement with the fall  of  Troy. Admittedly, that seems impious, if  piety calls 
for  a commitment to permanent providence. Troilus  and  Criseyde  does end with a 
suggestion that Providence has intervened for  Troilus in the conveying of  his soul 
(5.1808-10). Chaucer's last shell of  closure turns to a Christian Providence free  of 
time, as the Trinity can be counted backwards and forward  (5.1863-68). Only be-
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yond the story did Chaucer begin to fill  in the shadows of  omitted sections of 
Boethius's Consolation. 
We may pause to consider what human action Predestination still entails. 
Viewed piously, what will have occurred is referred  to divine direction, so that it 
may be said in retrospect that what has happened has happened for  the best. Yet 
while the human actor may remain at the hiatus entirely passive, a fatalist,  partici-
pation in the action of  the moment involves the choice and risk of  the operation of 
some divine direction. It might be direction by combined planets in the astrologi-
cal system which Chaucer himself  studied and to which some of  his characters 
and narrators adhere (Troilus in the fear  that Venus may not be entirely favourable 
to him, so his fatalism  tends toward despair rather than to hope; and elaborately in 
"The Knight's Tale" the doling out of  compromise goods by planetary gods), or it 
may be a fatalism  committed to benign divine intervention, calling for  a choice by 
the human actor of  the good to which providence is atemporally proposing a hier-
archy. While biblical Providence may become "previdence," if  divine providence 
can produce miracles that reduce contingency, we can pause to consider the willed 
action still required. For example, the Lord made trial of  Abraham (tentavit,  Vulgate; 
did  tempt,  Authorized Version) in commanding the sacrifice  of  Isaac (Gen. 22.1). 
In uncertainty the human actor had fully  to choose, the knife  be drawn at the youth's 
neck, for  intervention to impose the hiatus of  recognition, and there was that un-
canny moment of  contingency, whether savage or benign. If  Abraham had simply 
loved his son, he would not have drawn his knife,  and the Lord would not have 
rewarded him with a miraculous and providential son who would be the father  of 
nations. Abraham had to will to act on the belief  that the Lord was provident, and 
he already had had the promise of  descendants (Gen. 13.16). Although the Lord 
was already certain of  Abraham (Gen. 18.17-19), He "watched" Abraham in ac-
tion ("Appellavitque nomen loci illius, Dominus videt. Unde usque hodie dicitur: 
In monte Dominus videbit," Gen. 22.14).16 Isaac, meanwhile, did worry what pro-
visions his father  had made (Gen. 22.7). Attitude is also an action, as it is for  Job, 
suffering  the pains of  the Lord's experiment. For Job the gap is longer between 
apparently inevitable disaster and the surprise of  unexpected rescue, and to him 
the Lord proclaims His providence to be uncanny.17 It may be too that Patience is 
often  what is called on as the "virtue of  necessity," as in Chaucer's tales of  passive 
heroines, such as "The Man of  Law's Tale." 
Eyvind Ronquist 101 
We may also shift  attention for  a moment to consider the contemporaneous 
narrative of  Sir  Gawain and  the Green Knight.  The narrator ofthat  austere romance 
reminds us that "i>e forme  to ¡)e fynisment  foldez  ful  seiden" which might immedi-
ately suggest simply that one never knows, reinforcing  the darker clause that "J)a3 
J)e ende be heuy, haf  3e no wonder" (499,496). Yet in the longer story, while the end 
is a source of  chagrin for  Gawain, it is not of  mortal weight. The story has it that 
Gawain attempted to manipulate the inevitability of  the Green Knight's blow with a 
clandestine and allegedly magical green girdle. This brings him closer to a mortal 
cut, but, as it turns out, he receives a mere nick in the neck that does not match the 
beheading he had dealt to the Green Knight a year earlier. Were I Gawain, I would 
continue to speculate about what would have happened if  I had not hidden the green 
girdle and had simply trusted God or the Green Knight. A pious response is that the 
permanent virtues outward on his shield and the Virgin Mary inward would have 
rewarded him with fame  and salvation, yet they might not have guaranteed him life 
and success, which instead continued to depend on the concealed and perhaps amused 
good will of  the disguised Green Knight and of  Morgan la Fay.18 
Ill 
A more liberating instance of  the complication of  attempting to think about the 
future  appears in Chaucer's "Nun's Priest's Tale." Chauntecleer, the rooster, has a 
theory of  the prophetic nature of  dreams, that the future  is both thereby knowable 
and also inevitable. His dream of  a threatening foxlike  but unnamable creature is 
confirmed  that very day by an encounter with a fox  who does want to eat him, Don 
Russell by name. Chauntecleer at that moment senses anger without remembering 
and applying his dream of  the previous night, and the narrator suggests it is sheer 
animal instinct (7.3275-81). We might also suppose the dream had been provoked 
by instinct, except that Chauntecleer had an articulate theory about it. 
The dream, meanwhile, is not confirmed,  because Chauntecleer gets free  of  the 
fox's  jaws. He does so, however, by picturing the encounter as fatal,  and thus as 
what his dream had warned him of.  At that moment of  extreme fatalism,  he declares 
himself  already dead. But not so simply. Chauntecleer actively engages a strategic 
purpose, thinking clearly (we can give him credit and say that finding  the strategy is 
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more than good luck), because it is Russell the fox  he invites to proclaim the victory. 
The fox  to boast must open his jaws, and Chauntecleer flies  to safety.  Picturing the 
worst is part of  the strategy, yet inevitability is evoked to serve improvisation, rhe-
torical manipulation, and a lucky chance. The proposition of  preordained certainty 
is presented rhetorically to Russell, with directions for  the certainty of  the proposi-
tions Russell is to use: 
Sire, if  that I were as ye, 
Yet sholde I seyn, as wys God helpe me, 
'Turneth agayn, ye proude cherles alle! 
A verray pestilence upon yow falle! 
Now I am come unto the wodes syde; 
Maugree youre heed, the cok shal heere abyde. 
I wol hym ete, in feith,  and that anon! ' 
(CT  7.3407-13) 
"The Nun's Priest's Tale" demonstrates the limits of  fatalism  and the complex-
ity of  choice among diverse goods. Chauntecleer was persuaded of  the predictability 
of  future  events, and the examples he cited from  Cicero were of  cases where there 
was no intervention and the event predicted in a dream took place (or the dream was 
a simultaneous communication of  a dire event taking place). Chauntecleer was suf-
ficiently  a fatalist  that he did not feel  obliged to act on his dream by staying out of 
harm, as if  the dream would be realized no matter what he did, but we know that the 
nearer reason he did not hold true to his conviction was his active choice of  hedon-
istic short-term pleasure with Pertelote, the most articulate of  his hens. Don Russell 
further  complicates Chauntecleer's choices by inviting him to substitute pride (pride 
in the singing which is a family  tradition) for  instinctive self-preservation,  and he is 
captured. But, again, in the least of  actions by fully  imagining the worst and giving 
it ingenious direction, Chauntecleer avoids his fate.  He gives rich meaning to the 
rule of  "The Knight's Tale" to make virtue of  necessity. Virtue in this rule becomes 
not habit but the skill of  decision and attitude in the face  of  blind inevitability, sub-
stituting initiative intelligence for  a mechanism of  external causation. "I wol hym 
ete," the declaration Chauntecleer proposes Don Russell make, is a proposition about 
a future  contingent, and not "necessarily true." Chauntecleer had freedom  to act 
while in dire constraint and while renouncing his lesser desire for  honour. His dream 
prophecy was not fulfilled;  the curse to be pronounced against the villagers' pride 
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was not effected.  The morals drawn by the two beasts also are distant from  fatalism. 
Russell's lesson, put simply, is "Keep your mouth shut," in which case performative 
claims for  the future  will not be made. Chauntecleer's is "Keep your eyes open." 
This must mean "Look for  the unexpected"; it is not Troilus's forlorn  scrutiny of  the 
horizon for  the return of  familiar  Criseyde. 
In the Canterbury  Tales  "The Nun's Priest's Tale" follows  "The Monk's Tale," 
which promised inductively a bad fate  for  anyone, with or without a tragic flaw.  We 
may expect a challenge to its fatalism.  The narrator we call the Nun's Priest highlights 
the imperiousness of  omniscient and didactic narration. The distance his narration sets 
between histoire and discours  problematizes and reinitiates enquiry into foreknowl-
edge and future  contingency. The narrator introduces Don Russell as what had been 
"By heigh ymaginacioun forncast"  (CT 7.3217) in a dream inspired by God (an echo 
of  the "alta fantasia"  of  Dante, Purgatorio!!  .25, according to Pratt 565-68). The nar-
rator proclaims peril as certainty, and says it was known in advance by God:19 
O Chauntecleer, acursed be that morwe 
That thou into that yerd flaugh  fro  the bemes! 
Thou were fill  wel ywarned by thy dremes 
That thilke day was perilous to thee; 
But what that God forwoot  moot nedes bee, 
After  the opinioun of  certein clerkis. 
(CT7.3230-35) 
But he is beginning to transfer  his certainty to a bibliographic enquiry, remem-
bering with the Wife  of  Bath (or a Chaucerian scribe) that "Diverse scoles maken 
parfyt  Clerkes" {CT3.44c): 
Witnesse on hym that any parfit  clerk is, 
That in scole is greet altercacioun 
In this mateere, and greet disputisoun, 
And hath been of  an hundred thousand men. 
But I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren 
As kan the hooly doctour Augustyn, 
Or Boece, or the Bisshop Bradwardyn, 
Wheither that Goddes worthy forwityng 
Streyneth me nedely for  to doon a thyng -
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'Nedely' clepe I symple necessitee -
Or elles, if  free  choys be graunted me 
To do that same thyng, or do it noght. . . 
(CT  7.3236-47) 
I must share the Nun's Priest's confession  of  faltering  in the doxographic effort 
of  tracking logicians and theologians up to the most recent discussions. For sifting 
out error and validity from  the bren or husks, the Nun's Priest provides an initial 
bibliography that could be expanded, I suspect, with a hundred recent articles ex-
ploring just the views of  Augustine, Boethius, and Bradwardine. Thus, Eleonore 
Stump, before  advancing her own interesting correction of  Augustine, cites John 
Rist: "There is still no consensus of  opinion on Augustine's view of  each man's 
responsibility for  his moral behaviour"20 (Augustine's thinking troubled particularly 
by his belief  that sinful  mankind is incapable of  securing God's grace and yet that 
salvation is promised). Boethius in the Consolation  of  Philosophy reverted to analy-
sis of  pagan terminology, criticizing Aristotle De interpretatione  9. Bradwardine in 
the earlier fourteenth  century was part of  an Augustinian revival of  a "more personal 
and immediate view of  God," and distinctively in taking up Augustine's attack on 
Pelagians he "rejected not only all claims for  the independent existence of  free  will, 
but denied any other form  of  determinism in the interest of  God's" (Leff  4, 15). It 
would be tempting to suppose that because Bradwardine was the most recent thinker 
named he was the closest to Chaucer's own thinking, but I find  it impossible to read 
the tale as justification  of  theocentric determinism, given the ingenuity of 
Chauntecleer's escape. I guess it is just possible that God loved Chauntecleer from 
the start, although his status as a beast would deny him an immortal soul. Bradwardine 
was taken up again by John Wyelif  closer to Chaucer's time, but I would argue that 
he is in the Nun's Priest's short reading list for  the challenge of  an extreme position 
that still by the end of  the century could be considered along with the opposing 
current of  William Ockham and Robert Holcot that gave greater emphasis to free 
will.21 Indeed, Robert A. Pratt argued that the discussion of  dreams in "The Nun's 
Priest's Tale" was drawn in large part from  Holcot's commentary on the Liber 
Sapientiae.  As to the theory of  Boethius, we can say Chauntecleer would have done 
better to keep in mind a hierarchy of  goods, but the narrator did not ask him to 
eschew lesser goods. 
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In any case, the narrator is wrong in evoking "destinee, that mayst nat been 
eschewed" (7.3338; sim. 7. 3225, 3233). He thunders prophetic music, but 
Chauntecleer does better than he supposed and gets a second chance, as characters 
in the Canterbury  Tales  often  do. The clamour, too, of  the villagers, evoked with the 
terror of  the Uprising of  1381, falls  unmentioned when Chauntecleer and Russell 
are left  reflecting  on their mishaps.22 
IV 
In solitude or moments of  calm, Chaucer permits his characters to discourse, 
and they and he may shift  from  the direct intervention of  narrative to various forms 
of  more or less successful  philosophizing that gives them general opinions as a basis 
to choose the next step into the future.  Criseyde calls this seeing with the third eye of 
Prudence, while regretting that she has not been good at it (Tr  5.743-49, concluding 
"But future  tyme, er I was in the snare, / Koude I nat sen; that causeth now my 
care"). Thinking about the future  in a simple form  consists of  induction from  exam-
ple, as in Chauntecleer's gathering of  examples of  dreams that have come true, or in 
a more complex way in "The Franklin's Tale" Dorigen's review of  examples of 
women responding to rape, this before  she has had any meeting with the lover who 
claims her. Dorigen uses the dialectic procedure of  a review of  opinions, which 
more widely the Canterbury  Tales  as a whole provides, just as the Nun's Priest 
began to list theological theories.231 am thinking of  how Aristotle and later the scho-
lastic theologians began with a survey of  opinions, doxa,  before  making their own 
formulations.  Unhappy the character who has no time to consider alternatives, as 
with Virginia in "The Physician's Tale," who manages to advance only the example 
of  Jephtha's daughter before  her father  cuts her head off,  but then this story is an 
unhappy variation also of  the story of  Abraham and Isaac, allowing no intervention 
to halt the murderous sacrifice,  though it has some later social benefit.  The Formel 
Eagle in Parliament  of  Fowls  is given time at least to consider options for  what may 
later be obligatory marriage, and Theseus, though peremptory in "The Knight's Tale," 
gives Emelye an important philosophical position to work with—the making virtue 
of  necessity. Other women faced  with marriage have less of  a moment for  consid-
eration, notably Maius in "The Merchant's Tale," who is simply warned by her hus-
band she won't enjoy her wedding night, and Grisildis, in "The Clerk's Tale," who 
106 Chaucer's Provisions for  Future Contingencies 
apparently thought commanding Walter would be as benign as she was. In "The 
Wife  of  Bath's Tale" marital intercourse is preceded by elaborate deliberation. 
The pause to think is crucial. An instance in the philosophical tradition would 
be the intervals of  stasis to which Socrates found  himself  sometimes compelled by 
his Daimon. Solitude is individualizing; the individual finds  his or her own basis of 
intuition (cf.  Goodall). In Chaucer, even a position urging a traditional method of 
thinking is announced through a pause for  consideration: "Stondeth upon the weyes, 
and seeth and axeth of  olde pathes (that is to seyn, of  olde sentences) which is the 
goode wey, and walketh in that wey," with the promise that "ye shal fynde  refresshynge 
for  youre soules": thus the Parson, expanding on Jeremiah 6:16 (CT  10.77-78). As 
narrator he thus marks "The Parson's Tale" as a position within the doxographic 
survey that is the Canterbury  Tales,  while as a character in the "General Prologue" 
he was initially encountered in his practice rather than his doctrine ("This noble 
ensample to his sheep he yaf,  / That first  he wroghte, and afterward  he taughte," CT 
1.496-97). In Chaucer the determination and refutation  is oftenpentimento,  that is, 
chagrin or further  uncertainty, and "The Parson's Tale" is taken from  manuals of 
confession  to become an instrument of  self-scrutiny.  What has been called the "Refu-
tations" of  the Canterbuiy  Tales  declares the didactic uncertainty of  much of 
Chaucer's writing, holds out points of  doctrine, but concludes in a simple hope for 
salvation in the terms of  the Christian Creed. The Prologue to "The Tale of  Melibee" 
(CT  7.951 ) evokes the single teaching of  the Four Gospels (in the Augustinian tradi-
tion of  De doctrina  christiana 1.34-36, we can say), but acknowledges their "tellyng 
difference"  (CT  7.948; see Morrison for  the hermeneutic problem). The tale that 
follows  provides maxims for  varied occasions and reaches action that is the result of 
renunciation of  the initial plan of  Melibee and depends on the repentent good will of 
his adversaries. The material from  Albertano of  Brescia is advice about advice, a 
reference  handbook of  advice, rather than a singular formula,  like the rule of  charity. 
"The Friar's Tale" evokes the punishment of  damnation, but the soul-hunting devil 
of  the tale is careful  to allow for  change and deliberation before  he seizes his prey 
(see the nuanced discussion by Kline). 
Chaucer's discursive poems strikingly conclude in uncertainty: 
and yit I rede alwey. 
I hope, ywis, to rede so som day 
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That I shal mete som thyng for  to fare 
The bet, and thus to rede I nyl nat spare. 
(PF  696-99) 
This is what passes for  the conclusion of  The  Parliament  of  Fowls,  which has 
followed  willy-nilly allurement and threat, culture and nature, with debate, limited 
certainty, and suspension of  judgement.24 The dream format  permits vignettes in 
suspension, simulacra of  the practical world, potential patterns of  activity. Only The 
Book of  the Duchess, because of  its allegorical abstraction, suggests that the Man in 
Black may forever  persist in mourning and evasion. Troilus  and  Criseyde  in its last 
stanzas suggests a fresh  way of  reading the story, and makes plans for  a comedy. 
Chaucer often  suspends action to consider the nature of  temporal causation, 
and this pause is a hiatus that prevents simple tracking from  the present to the future. 
The contingency and indétermination of  the future  is thus emphasized. Its determi-
nation depends on the human actor. Mid-course in the Canterbury  Tales,  Chaucer 
has his Pilgrims disparage the fatalism  of  "The Monk's Tale," which is framed  be-
tween the mercenary transactions of  "The Shipman's Tale" and the inspired good 
sense of  the Nun's Priest's Chauntecleer, who makes more artful  use of  his initial 
pessimism. "The Nun's Priest's Tale" would also mark a departure from  the reitera-
tive traditionalism and the violent human enforcement  of  divine intervention of  "The 
Prioress's Tale." The cause of  anxiety in Troilus  and  Criseyde,  contingency in the 
Canterbury  Tales  is thus welcome solace. 
There have been various readings of  Chaucer's attitude toward change. To 
take two recent instances, Green has found  the mindset of  the later fourteenth 
century to be "Saturnian" (both malevolent and nostalgic), and presumably 
Chaucer's also, based on discursive lyrics such as "The Former Age" and "Lak of 
Stedfastnesse,"25  while Pearsall provocatively has proposed "a time-serving op-
portunist and placeman, who pictured his own pliability in all that he saw" (8). In 
contrast to either of  these positions, I have been discussing instances that do show 
concern about the future,  with an interest in experiment I have elsewhere called 
pragmatic ("Rhetoric"; see Anderson for  some contemporary approaches to con-
tingency). Chaucer suspends pious anticipation of  Providence for  a variety of 
smaller moves. Already in Troilus  and  Criseyde  the Classical, Horatian, ethic of 
carpe diem  could be raised (cf.  Ronquist, "Franklin"). The boisterous energy and 
experimentalism of  his last work, the Canterbury  Tales,  suggests he was not a 
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pessimist. We can make positive use of  the disjunction between present and fu-
ture, so that the future  can hopefully  be different  from  the past. Why and how still 
have to be distinguished. If  dissatisfaction  is not an inevitable condition, one can 
hope for  change by removing the causes of  dissatisfaction.  It still remains that the 
future  is uncertain, so change is ventured on as an experiment with a change in 
variables. This pragmatic approach to the future  is a procedure based on steps of 
experience, with possible modifications  of  the goal.26 
Behind the dissatisfactions  of  Chaucer's characters lurk large issues that in 
long historical time have seen change, as long as we are "not looking for  causes, 
but for  prototypes of  modern ways of  life  and thought," as Oberman puts it ("Shape" 
5). Authoritarian monarchy, liable to tyranny, became constitutional. Abuses of 
ecclesiastical power were attacked in a reformation.  The organization of  gender 
roles (and marriage in consequence) is only recently realigning to reduce dissatis-
faction,  as women participate in public affairs  and religious offices,  as marriage is 
seen as a limited contract, and as friendship  is taken as the basis of  love and civil 
union. These developments are hard to justify  directly on Chaucer's authority, but 
nevertheless his works have furnished  authority to reformers  in these areas. The 
Wife  of  Bath and the liberty of  Criseyde are not entirely historically distant phe-
nomena and arouse direct rancour and admiration, and there are good words for 
what is seen as the defiant  camp of  the Pardoner. As scholars rather than polemi-
cists we want to give characters their fullest  scope of  performance  in Chaucer's 
own period, but we can see that they do not necessarily reiterate tradition. As old 
seeds become new crops (PF  22-25), we may get something like the open project 
of  the Legend  of  Good  Women,  where a new range of  suffering  is named martyr-
dom, and there is a new cast of  the historically famous.  In the Canterbury  Tales 
there are endings after  the endings that permit a revised social alignment. As has 
been noted, in "The Clerk's Tale" Grisildis's peasant father  ends up living with 
her and noble Walter in the palace. It would seem that with his tests of  Grisildis, 
Walter had hoped for  falsification  of  an hypothesis of  the steadfastness  of  women— 
his social presuppositions make it implausible to assume that he was as confident 
in advance of  her worthiness as God was of  Abraham and Job. In "The Franklin's 
Tale," the squire Aurelius learns that romances of  courtly adultery are not neces-
sarily realistic, Dorigen that choice and discretion matter at every instance, that 
feared  disaster is not inevitable, that improvisation is possible beyond historical 
examples. In "The Merchant's Tale" ocular fact  can be negated. "The Wife  of 
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Bath's Prologue and Tale" show confidence  in social revision: "Welcome the sixte, 
whan that evere he shal" (CT  3.45). A rapist there comes to accept a woman's 
choice despite the drastic contingency of  her appearance (he has already been 
forgiven  by the council of  women). In her fifth  marriage the Wife  of  Bath rips out 
pages of  traditional accounts of  women, there is danger of  death and accusation of 
murder, but she and her clerk husband, she says, "fille  acorded by us selven two" 
(CT 3.812). This marks a new beginning, like the discovery of  law by small groups 
of  revolutionaries, as pictured by Hannah Arendt in On Revolution  (see particu-
larly ch. 5, and the conclusion 279-85). Critics have sometimes emphasized the 
always and already inevitable limitations on women in Chaucer's narratives, but 
is it not the case that he allows choice and movement? 
Chaucer was exploring the relaxation of  inevitability. Play, Middle English 
game, permits momentary shifts  of  impulse and chance. Marked as game, "The 
Miller's Tale" evokes impulse as a corrective to the seeming perfection  of  historical 
closure of  "The Knight's Tale," which turned what "so bifel,  by aventure or cas" into 
the work of  Fortune or the stars {CT  1.1074-90, cas from  casus 'chance'). Yet in 
"The Knight's Tale," too, the happenstance of  a glimpse of  beauty opened elaborate 
plans for  happiness. Human beings are called on to be active and imaginative. They 
are not to hold to their propositions without corresponding acts of  will: words must 
be cousin to the deed (CT  1.742). The ethics of  virtue converting necessity is an art 
like architecture and medicine that finds  resources for  fresh  constructions. In 
Chaucer's characteristic usage, truth is not simply a logistic property, with the ques-
tion of  when or how statements about the future  are valid whether through contin-
gency or necessity.27 Rather in his Middle English truth is a performative  commit-
ment requiring choice of  future  loyalty, and apprehensively it is joined in rhyme by 
ruth or pity.28 Pity in turn can participate and ameliorate. The contingency of  con-
ceptions of  the future  allows shadowy potential to be empowered into fresh  actual-
ity. What is not fated  but possible can be reformed. 
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Notes 
1 This paper was first  presented in the congenial conference  of  the Canadian 
Society of  Medievalists, 30 May 2003, in a Congress of  the Humanities and 
Social Sciences of  Canada considering the general theme of  Conflict  and 
Cooperation. I am very grateful  for  the stimulating and watchful  comments 
of  the readers and editors for  this publication. 
2 See, for  example, Sklute, and Shepherd's observation about Chaucer, "As a 
writer he seems always to have been puzzled by some variation of  the question: 
How does a succession of  events make any sense" (116), but in this short 
paper I will not engage widely with the voluminous discourse of  criticism. 
3 I would argue that the successive books of  Troilus  and  Criseyde  work in 
divergent narrative modes, with different  "muses," focus,  sequencing, and 
thoughtful  reflections. 
4 I take it to be a problem, though Adams and Kretzmann take Aristotle to be a 
"fatalist"  for  whom "no events, actions, or states of  affairs  are contingent" (3-
5). William Ockham, whose commentary they translate, sees "several 
absurdities from  the absurdity already deduced" (101). 
5 Oberman does call for  a larger sense of  contingency and a historical problem 
that would also bear on Chaucer's narration of  past events: "Contingency is 
perhaps the best one-word summary of  the nominalist program. This 
contingency is understood in two directions, embracing both the vertical 
relation God-world-man and the horizontal relation world-man-future.  We 
cannot pursue now this second form  of  contingency, which concerns the so-
called question "De futuris  contingentibus."  When applied not only to the 
future  but also to the past, it provides for  a truly scholarly basis of  historical 
studies by its tendency to eliminate supernatural factors  in the interpretation 
of  the course of  events" ("Shape" 13). 
6 Thinkers such as Anscombe and Wolff  show how debate continues on the import 
of  Aristotle's finding. 
7 "Illud quod erit et potest non fore,  vel quod non erit et potest fore,"  Pierre 
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d'Ailly, Quaestiones Magistri  Petri  de  Aylliaco super I.  Sententiarum,  Q. 12, 
Β (Strassburg, 1490), qtd. in Boehner, ed., Ockham, 44. For other medieval 
formulations  see Normone. 
8 As to the purity of  logic Cohen and Nagel declare "just as we have distinguished 
the proposition (as the objective meaning) from  the sentence which states it, 
so we must distinguish it from  the act of  the mind or the judgment which 
thinks it" (28). 
9 So Jevons, "Any subject or branch of  knowledge in which universal statements 
cannot usually be made is called contingent matter... In reality ... this part of 
logical doctrine is thoroughly illogical, because in treating a proposition we 
have no right... to assume ourselves acquainted with the science to which it 
refers.  Our duty is to elicit the exact consequences of  any statements given to 
us. We must learn in logic to transform  information  in every possible way, 
but not to add extraneous facts"  (80), and Kretzmann, "A contingency depends 
for  its truth or falsity  on the truth or falsity  of  various substitution-instances 
for  its variables, which, in turn, must be decided on the basis of  information 
that lies outside the subject-matter of  formal  logic" (35). For the synonym 
empirical,  Barker 26; for  Ockham, Courtenay 37. 
10 In the definition  of  Mill, an admitted "Pelagian," "A fatalist  believes, or half 
believes (for  nobody is a consistent fatalist),  not only that whatever is about 
to happen, will be the infallible  result of  the causes which produce it (which 
is the true necessitarian doctrine), but moreover that there is no use in struggling 
against it; that it will happen however we may strive to prevent it" (6.2.1, 3 
[8: 836, 840]). 
11 Bloomfield  held that "Troilus  and  Criseyde  is a medieval tragedy of 
predestination because the reader is continually forced  by the commentator 
to look upon the story from  the point of  view of  its end and from  a distance" 
(22). "I think he stands with Bishop Bradwardine," he said (23). True that in 
epic style Chaucer declares from  the start "ye may the double sorwes here / 
Of  Troilus in lovynge of  Criseyde, / And how that she forsook  hym er she 
deyde" {Tr  1.54-56), but he also leaves extensive passages to the characters' 
own words and shows concern and forgiveness  for  their plights. 
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12 Byrd provides a useful  account of  deliberative moments in Troilus  and  Criseyde. 
13 In the period we now call entre deux  guerres,  Giraudoux returned the Trojan War 
to contingency by using the future  tense in La guerre  de  Troie  η 'aura  pas lieu. 
14 Noting "the impingement upon the ideal of  the banal and work-a-day," Sharrock 
declared, "The horror into which Criseyde falls  is that horror of  the contingent 
that cuts across particular quirks of  personality and lies in wait for  all of 
us"(148, 152). 
15 Struck by the "goddess" of  Criseyde, Troilus pledged service unto death (1.421-
27); Criseyde suspected intoxication when she saw Troilus as more "knightly" 
than Mars (2.628-51). 
16 The understanding of  an action is different  as it is watched or as it is performed. 
The former  is scenic and permits judgement of  the whole of  the action and 
allegorical assessment of  values. The latter emphasizes the intention of  the 
actor. See, for  instance, Ricoeur, chs. 5-6, for  "l'identité narrative," and 
Aristotle, Poetics 18, as expanded by Burke, esp. chs. 1.1 and 2. 
17 Cf.  Courtenay on the fourteenth  century "increase in Biblical theology" (58). 
18 Spearing discusses the ending of  Sir  Gawain and  the Green Knight  in 
comparison with other Middle English narratives, including Troilus  and 
Criseyde  (esp. chs. 5 and 8). 
19 Later, at the moment of  actual peril for  Chauntecleer, the Nun's Priest evokes 
Geoffroi  de Vinsauf's  tragic lament for  Richard I (367-430), which, combined 
with a memory of  the Uprising of  1381, would imply an admonition to the 
present king, Richard II. It threatens risk rather than future  fact,  and might 
have had the flavour  of  prophecy except that it lacks solemnity. In "The 
Pardoner's Tale," the Old Man who points the Revellers to the finding  of  a 
person they name Death may know only that they will find  a treasure and that 
"Radix malorum est cupiditas," the sermon theme. 
20 Stump 124, citing John Rist, "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," 
Journal  of  Theological  Studies  20 (1969): 420. 
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21 Robson, chs. 2-4 (32-112), details divergent theses subsequent to Bradwardine. 
According to Kenny, while Wyclif  was condemned after  his death as an 
"extreme determinist," his reconciliation of  human freedom  and God's 
foreknowledge  "is that we should say that the relationship between the divine 
volition and the human action is a two-way one: if  God's volition causes 
man's act, so, in a sense, man's act causes God's volition" (31, 37). For the 
"catholicity" of  so-called nominalists such as Ockham, despite semi-
pelagianism, and for  Holcot's fideism  and a connection with Bradwardine, 
see Oberman, Harvest  423-28, 235-48. 
22 Charles Muscatine observed that "The one constancy in the poem is this shifting 
of  focus,  the Chaucerian multiple perspective which itself  virtually constitutes 
the theme," such that "The plot is tragic, until it ends happily. It is an allegory 
of  the Fall - leaving Man, somewhat wiser, still in possession of  his paradise, 
or his chicken yard" (239, 242). 
23 The survey is wide but not necessarily systematic, though critics like Allen and 
Moritz have tried to work out its consistency. 
24 Pearsall observes that "Chaucer's poetic techniques are not clever ways of 
arriving by indirect routes at paraphrasable answers. The techniques of 
indirection, of  non-assertion, are the realities. The question is open, and it is 
necessary that we should be puzzled" (122-23). 
25 Green xiii, 39-40, 391; 160-61 for  an extension to our own time. In some 
contrast, in answer to Saturnian melancholy Brown and Butcher find  mixed 
projects of  reform,  regeneration, and restoration (vii, 250). 
26 Howard limits pragmatism to the moves of  Pandarus (161, 163). 
27 See extensively Green, especially 1-31. 
28 For a larger issue, cf.  Courtenay: "The unique feature  of  Ockhamist thought 
was that these ideas were all present and grounded in the idea of  pact, or 
covenant - willed verbal agreements that are no less dependable and certain 
because they are in origin voluntary" (51). 
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